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THE SENTENCE BARGAINING OF
UPPERWORLD AND UNDERWORLD




This paper explores the use of different types of sentence bargain-
ing tactics in ten federal district courts. We distinguish between proac-
tive and reactive prosecutorial orientation, and hypothesize that
proactive prosecution of upperworld crime is associated with more ex-
plicit sentence bargaining than is the reactive prosecution of under-
world crime. We present evidence for and explanations of this
relationship.
This paper is concerned with plea negotiations involving
sentence bargaining in United States District Courts. Federal
courts are interesting in part because, unlike state courts, they
have the capacity and jurisdiction to prosecute many forms of
upperworld crime, although they do not always exercise that
authority. Our thesis is that a prosecutorial focus on up-
perworld crimes in the federal district courts is associated with
the use of specific types of bargaining tactics that involve a
strategic and explicit juxtaposition of coercive threats and
promised concessions. The social organization of these and
other tactics is the subject of our discussion.
I. STUDYING STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Most research on plea negotiation, and criminal justice
processing more generally, has focused on state courts. In con-
trast, research reported in this paper is based on fieldwork
done on federal courts in ten districts: Northern and Southern
New York, Northern Illinois, Eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Northern Texas, Eastern Missouri, Northern Georgia, Central
California, and Eastern Michigan. Selection of these ten dis-
tricts was determined by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, the agency that collected a large body of
archival data used in other parts of our research. In this paper
This research was supported by a grant from the National Institute of
Mental Health. The article represents our own views and not necessarily those
of NIMH. The findings reported in this paper are exploratory and will be pur-
sued further in a monograph in preparation by the authors. A further discus-
sion of the distinction between proactive and reactive prosecutor's offices can
be found in Bernstein and Hagan (1978).
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we consider qualitative data obtained through site visits to
each of the ten districts, during which we observed approxi-
mately 200 hours of court proceedings and conducted approxi-
mately 600 hours of interviews with court personnel involved in
decisionmaking in criminal cases: the Chief Judge and three to
five presiding judges, the United States Attorney and Assistant
United States Attorneys responsible for subsections of the of-
fice dealing with criminal matters, the Chief Probation Officer,
the Head of the Pre-Trial Services Agency, the Senior Magis-
trate and a sample of other Magistrates who handle criminal
cases, the Chief of the Public Defender Office, and private at-
torneys who frequently handle criminal cases. It is these inter-
view data that are discussed most extensively in this paper.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The distinction drawn between the state and federal sys-
tems is an important one with significant implications for
prosecutorial negotiation and coercion. The salient feature of
state courts is that they are organized almost exclusively to re-
spond to cases brought to them by local police. In large part,
this stems from the fact that municipal police work is heavily
"reactive," that is, responsive to citizen complaints (Black,
1973). In other words, the state courts respond largely to being
overburdened. Faced with a large number of police processed
citizen complaints, most state courts have little recourse but to
process as efficiently as possible the volume and types of cases
they receive. To do otherwise would be to undercut police and
public support (see Reiss, 1971), for the state courts are, in ef-
fect, "courts of last resort."
In contrast, the federal courts have much greater potential
for selectively determining the composition and size of their
case loads, although they do not always develop this potential.
Despite the fact that federal courts receive the bulk of their
case referrals from federal enforcement agencies (e.g., the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency,
and the Internal Revenue Service), they are not limited to
agency input. Some offices have their own investigative agents.
Furthermore, by working closely with federal prosecutors, the
enforcement agencies can play a more creative role in "proac-
tively" determining which areas of enforcement the court will
emphasize. As a result, federal courts frequently devote con-
siderable attention to the prosecution of upperworld as well as
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underworld crime. This point is well-illustrated by the follow-
ing excerpt from ar interview with an Assistant United States
Attorney in one of the most proactive offices we encountered.
[TJhe way I operate is I basically initiate grand jury investigations
where I think it is appropriate. The - case, which was a major
land sales fraud case, is a very good example of that. Basically my phi-
losophy is that the resources here are limited .... You can never pros-
ecute all the crimes that are being committed, and you can never
prosecute all the white-collar crimes. Going into the decisionmaking
process for me are the following: (1) I want it to be obviously a case
with federal impact-that is, a federal problem that we are looking at,
and not a local state problem; (2) that the impact is broad; and (3) for
me particularly I prefer to make cases in areas where nothing has been
done. In other words, to focus on an industry or problem where there
has not been a criminal prosecution .... So, I will pick an area such as
land fraud where there was a lot of good information about serious
abuses but no criminal prosecutions and begin a grand jury investiga-
tion. And that resulted in the - case being brought and success-
fully prosecuted. And there are other areas .... 1 will just focus on
areas where there really hasn't been federal criminal enforcement, ar-
eas which have a consumer impact, and develop cases in those areas.
In contrast to the proactive orientation toward federal pros-
ecution just noted, it is interesting to consider the following re-
sponse encountered in a much more reactive U.S. Attorney's
Office, using the very concepts we have suggested:
For the most part, they [the enforcement agencies] are the experts.
They know whether there is a crime and they know how to prove it.
They will get the facts and bring us a package and there it is. I don't
know the FBI in Chicago, but I would imagine. . . more [the U.S. At-
torney] sitting down with the FBI and saying, "Okay, I want to go after
political corruption, let's go get it." . . . We are basically a reactive
agency and before setting priorities we have to consider that. We can't
just shut down our reactive side and go proactive and say "I'm sorry
we can't accept complaints now because we are too busy doing this."
We have to respond to the needs of all agencies and enforce the law.
The latter approach produces a caseload composed largely of
conventional underworld (e.g., "street") crime.
Based on such responses, we have concluded that the fed-
eral districts we have studied can be placed on a continuum
from "reactive" to "proactive" in terms of their allocation of
court resources and organizational orientations toward
prosecutorial discretion. Our interest is in the connection be-
tween this allocation of court resources, the resulting
caseloads, and the form prosecutorial negotiations take. Before
pursuing this issue, however, we need to consider some specific
differences between plea negotiations in the state and federal
systems.
III. PLEA BARGAINING IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Ground rules for plea negotiations in the federal courts are
outlined in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(1) charges may be reduced to lesser or related offenses; (2)
470 13 LAW & SOCIETY / WINTER 1979
the U.S. Attorney may promise to move to dismiss other
charges; (3) the U.S. Attorney may agree to recommend (or not
to oppose) the imposition of a particular sentence; and (4) the
U.S. Attorney and the defense attorney may agree that a given
sentence is an appropriate disposition of the case, with the de-
fendant's promise to plead guilty binding only if the court
agrees to that sentence. What distinguishes state and federal
courts is that the first of these possibilities, charge reduction, is
extremely common in the state courts (see, e.g., Sudnow, 1965;
Hagan, 1975; Bernstein et al., 1977) and relatively infrequent in
federal courts.
The reason for this difference is that state criminal codes
include lesser offenses to which charges frequently can be re-
duced, whereas the federal criminal code typically does not.
This point was made by an Assistant U.S. Attorney with experi-
ence in both systems:
[T]he state experience was that you could do a lot of wheeling and
dealing as a defense lawyer .... A lot of fictions are entered into. For
instance, with the elements. In order to get within a lesser included of-
fense, people kind of fudge the facts a bit .... Let me give you an ex-
ample. . . when I had the experience, breaking and entering was a ten
year maximum and a person might plead to entering without breaking
with intent to commit a larceny, which was a five year maximum even
though they broke. You get into those kind of games.... I've seen
people plead guilty in the state system to attempted possession of nar-
cotics, and I think that is pretty hard to do!
The problem federal prosecutors face is that the federal
criminal code less frequently includes graded offenses. A re-
sult is more explicit recourse to discussions of sentencing and
related sanctions. In following sections of this paper we ex-
plore the hypothesis that as a U.S. Attorney's Office becomes
more proactive in its orientation and allocation of resources,
and thereby pursues the prosecution of upperworld as well as
underworld offenders, discussions of sanctioning become a
more explicit part of the bargaining process. In essence, we are
suggesting a relationship between the creative use of
prosecutorial resources and the use of explicit threats and
promises in the federal district courts.
IV. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PROACTIVE JUSTICE
Making a U.S. Attorney's office more proactive in orienta-
tion is accompanied by the creation of new types of cases,
cases that are usually expensive and protracted in their devel-
opment. Particularly in the areas of white-collar crime and po-
litical corruption, it is often difficult to develop the type of
evidence required for successful prosecutions. A basic problem
is clearly identified by an Assistant U.S. Attorney: "It's not like
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a bank robbery where you have eyewitnesses that didn't take
part in the crime, but merely saw it happen. You don't have
that in official corruption ... [here] the only people that know
about the crime are the people that are involved in the crime."
In short, a means must be developed for "turning witnesses"
and securing their "cooperation" in the prosecution of a case.
We therefore sought to identify the techniques used by
prosecutors. Their range is suggested candidly in the following
interview:
Q: How do you urge cooperation from defendants?
A. We threaten to send them to jail. It's the most effective way we've
ever done it. We make a good, solid case on them and hang it over
their head like a hammer.
Q: And what are the mechanics of doing that, how exactly do you
present it to the defendant?
A. We tell them "if you don't cooperate, we will convict you. And we
will do it in a way that will make you look-we'll do it so well that
you would get really good jail time, a solid big chunk of time."
Q. At what stage do you do this?
A. Well, we are willing to make deals with people in a whole host of
ways running all the way from giving them a "pass" to they just
don't get prosecuted at all in return for testifying.
Q. Do you usually indict them first?
A: We make deals at all stages .... We talk to them before indict-
ment in the very big cases. Then we have all kinds of pleas like a
guy has committed a felony. We'll let him plead to a misdemeanor
and won't prosecute ... a whole range of things all the way 'till he
pleads to the principal count ... to charging him with exactly
what he did and saying nice things about him at sentencing.
The possibilities, then, are numerous and potentially coercive.
Promises of concessions as well as threats of coercion are
also part of the bargain a federal prosecutor can offer a "coop-
erative" defendant. A standard operating rule is "first in, best
out."
Q: Is there anything that suggests that one defendant should get a
better deal than another?
A: Yes. As soon as I heard there was an investigation into an area in
which I knew I was criminally involved, I would run to the U.S. At-
torney's Office and say, "Look, I will tell you all about it."
Q: You mean you reward those who come first?
A: Well, typically you have to work it-it's kind of a callous way to ap-
proach it, but you have to work "first in, best out." That is the way
you have to do it. It is unfortunate, but say you've offered a deal to
somebody and he rejects it and the next guy takes it; well, if you go
back to the first guy or he comes back to you, he's no longer the
first. So he doesn't get as good a deal as the first in. It's the way
you have to work and the defense lawyers know it.
A graded set of outcomes is particularly important in negotia-
tions with public officials charged with corruption, who often
persist in maintaining their innocence "on the courthouse
steps." Graded outcomes counter this tendency to "stonewall."
Federal prosecutors emphasize the importance of commu-
nicating their intentions and actions, as well as the conse-
quences of those actions, to the community of defense lawyers.
472 13 LAW & SOCIETY / WINTER 1979
The bar has got to be conditioned to flipping people. You can't do it by
yourself. You have got to have a sophisticated defense attorney on the
other side who knows when it is in their client's interest to cooperate.
You may today be up against a lawyer and arguing one side of a case
for the conviction of his client and the next day be with that same law-
yer and he is turning another client to become a witness for the gov-
ernment. So you have to establish your credibility because we all work
together and the cooperation of the bar is something that a prosecu-
tor's office needs in order to be effective. They have to know that when
they turn their client we will do what we say we will do and if we don't
say that we will do it, then we won't do it.
Essential to generating cooperation and establishing credi-
bility, of course, is a shared understanding between prosecu-
tion and judiciary that negotiated agreements will be
performed and expectations fulfilled. Our interviews suggest
that this exists at the levels of both practice and principle. On
a practical level, the following comment of an Assistant U.S. At-
torney is representative of a view common in proactive offices:
"I would say most judges understand that in order to expose of-
ficial corruption you do have to give some concessions to peo-
ple who are involved. Again, because only those people who
are involved know and can testify about it." Even more inter-
esting, however, is the way this practical need is coordinated
with the principles of sentencing: cooperation is treated as a
sign of contrition and thus predictive of rehabilitation. That
this is more rationalization than reason is suggested in the fol-
lowing excerpt from the interview just quoted:
I would say the judges do give some consideration simply because it
does show contrition and judges are going to disagree with me on this
but, when a federal district court judge gets to the point of passing sen-
tence upon people, he is acting not only as a representative of the peo-
ple but he is also acting as a law enforcement officer, because whatever
sentence he gives may bring about cooperation and may cause him
[the defendant] to tell the U.S. Attorney about other criminal activity.
The prosecutor at least is concerned with the practical first and
the ideal second.
We have established, then, that there are a number of ways
of eliciting cooperation from defendants, and that this type of
negotiation, using a mix of promised concessions and
threatened coercion, is very important to proactive prosecution.
In the next section of this paper, we examine more specifically
how these factors influence sentence bargaining by reactive
and proactive prosecutors in the federal courts.
V. BARGAINING PROCESSES
One of the most explicit forms of sentence bargaining pro-
vided in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a formal
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plea agreement concerning the recommendation the prosecu-
tion will or will not make to the judge. One of our major con-
cerns, then, is to determine how the use of sentence rec-
ommendations by prosecutors is related to the organizational
orientations of the ten jurisdictions we have studied.
TABLE 1









In Table 1 we have categorized our ten districts in terms of
organizational orientation and use of prosecutorial recommen-
dations for sentence. The districts were first dichotomized into
those in which prosecutors frequently and infrequently recom-
mend sentences. We then divided organizational orientation
into three categories-reactive, balanced, and proactive. Proac-
tive jurisdictions, it will be recalled, are unique in their empha-
sis on upperworld as well as underworld crime. Balanced
jurisdictions are those that are trying both to service the de-
mands of enforcement agencies as well as to develop new areas
of prosecution in a more proactive manner. Reflective of this
orientation is the following excerpt from an interview with a
U.S. Attorney in a district we have categorized as balanced:
The key to a successful office is in "alliance," and that is the word with
the investigative agencies. They have their needs and one of them is
they need their statistics to satisfy their bosses.... We've gotten
along fabulously in this district with the IRS and the FBI. We do a lit-
tle back-scratching .... We will not cut off the FBI and bank robbers
and so on .... They need statistics. They need to be able to beat the
drum a little bit. And I've got to help them and I will.... If you can
figure out a creative way to both relieve yourself of some of the burden
and still get statistics for the FBI, that is great. It is all part of the
game. I'm trying to do that here.
Although we clearly are limited in the number of districts
from which we can draw our conclusions, the results presented
in Table 1 provide preliminary evidence in support of our hy-
pothesis. The reactive districts in our small sample infre-
quently involve prosecutors in sentence recommendations,
while the balanced and proactive districts frequently do.
The involvement of prosecutors in recommending
sentences makes the process of sentence bargaining rather ex-
plicit. This does not mean, of course, that such bargaining is
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not prevalent, albeit less explicit, in reactive districts, or that
there are not other forms of explicit sentence bargaining in bal-
anced and proactive districts. Indeed, by considering several of
our districts in greater detail, we will be able to provide more
exploratory evidence in support of our proposition. We will
consider the two reactive districts first.
Less explicit sentence bargaining occurs in at least two dif-
ferent ways in the first of our reactive districts. The most fre-
quent approach is to drop counts and thereby limit the total
exposure to sentence.
We can bargain on counts, but we can't guarantee a probated sentence
or a certain amount of time. We can cut down the exposure .... Say
that you take the big dope case. You got the guy on five counts and he
is exposed to fifteen years on each count. You know darn well the
judge isn't going to give fifteen years. So why not say "okay, we'll drop
off three counts."
In this case, then, the concession may be more apparent than
real: the defendant may get the same sentence regardless of
how many counts are included, and there is no clear indication
of what that sentence might be. Nevertheless, the defendant is
reacting to a set of outcomes that are perceived to be real, and
therefore are real in terms of their consequences for the bar-
gaining process.
A second approach used in this reactive district is adopted
in cases where the defendant is providing more extensive coop-
eration. Information about this cooperation is relayed to the
judge either through the probation department's presentence
report or in a more confidential manner. An Assistant U.S. At-
torney describes these procedures:
In a normal situation where the guy wants to cooperate, and he doesn't
care who knows about it, we usually go through the probation office
and tell the person who draws up the presentence investigation what
the guy has done and make sure that cooperation gets passed along to
the judge .... However, this could also be done ahead of time in cham-
bers. The Defense Attorney and I may go into the judge ahead of time
and say-"Judge, I want to tell you [about] this man's cooperation. He
doesn't want it on the record"-and the attorney will explain. And
even if we make it known to the probation officer, if the guy wants us
to make real sure that the judge knows about it and wants us to tell the
judge again, we will tell the judge again. I have no qualms about telling
the judge what a guy has done.
This latter approach offers a sharp contrast to the practice of
having plea agreements presented formally to the court, al-
though the results may be the same. Similarly, the use of
presentence reports to relay information about prosecutorial
negotiations is somewhat at odds with the traditional role of
probation officers in assessing the defendant's potential for re-
habilitation. As noted earlier, the rationalization that coopera-
tion is a measure of contrition is not very convincing.
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The second of the reactive districts we considered utilizes a
more unusual set of procedures in which the key figure is the
Chief Magistrate. The U.S. Attorney in this district notes that
this Magistrate "has a unique role in the sense that he envi-
sions himself as sort of an expeditor of pleas, and the district
judges rely on him a great deal to sort of act as a traffic cop in
shuffling these criminal cases through by obtaining the neces-
sary pleas." The Magistrate performs this role through the use
of the pretrial conference.
The pre-trial conference is theoretically to iron out matters that
may be coming up and to clarify the parties' positions on various
items. . . .Now the real purpose of the pre-trial conference as run by
our Magistrate is to induce a plea of guilty. [The Magistrate] gets in
there and he gets a defendant that will not plead guilty .... Then he
simply tells him that "we've got a visiting judge coming in here from
South Dakota and he is a real hanger and I'm pretty sure if you go to
trial that you're going to get him on the draw." Finally, he tells him
"the Judge wants to know what you are going to do. I've got to have
that information .. "
This technique has worked very effectively in expediting the
bargaining process.
We turn finally to the two more proactive districts that do
not use prosecutorial sentence recommendations as a means of
sentence bargaining, in order to determine if those "negative"
cases contradict our hypothesis or simply employ some other
explicit technique to accomplish similar goals. Both follow a
similar policy. Assistant U.S. Attorneys "speak to the sen-
tence," even if they do not make a specific recommendation,
and also write "sentencing memos" to judges. One Assistant
noted that "we have a practice here of submitting sentencing
memos particularly in significant cases to bring to the judge's
attention any information which we think is appropriate to the
sentence. We do that in the white-collar cases for sure." The
extent to which these practices are correlated with a proactive
interest in white-collar crime, and ultimately with sentence
bargaining, becomes apparent in the following excerpt from an
interview with one of the U.S. Attorneys responsible for devel-
oping these policies.
Indeed we do not only take a position in sentencing in this office, in
most crimes at the time of sentencing we stand there and correct
whatever mistakes are made in the record. In one area where we do
get involved is white-collar crime, basically because unless we did al-
most everybody would walk out on probation. Our concern is that the
public sense of equal administration of justice requires that jail terms
be imposed no matter how wonderful their backgrounds.... So, yes, it
does operate in our plea bargaining .... If we can avoid a trial, we may
not suggest jail. If we do have to go through trial, you can expect that
we will speak for a tough sentence, and we seem to be having some ef-
fect on the judges.
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Thus, although these more proactive districts do not make for-
mal sentence recommendations, nonetheless, they do engage in
functionally equivalent practices that are no less explicit.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Evidence presented in the previous pages suggests that
proactive prosecution of upperworld crime leads to more ex-
plicit sentence bargaining, whereas reactive prosecution of un-
derworld crime involves less. In attempting to account for this
correlation we emphasize that it has been observed at the ag-
gregate level, so that we must be cautious in drawing infer-
ences based on the attributes of individuals. Furthermore, our
findings must be regarded as exploratory because of the small
number of districts considered.
The most plausible explanation of our observed correlation
focuses on three interrelated factors: the power and interests
of two major actors-prosecutors and white-collar defend-
ants-and the social organization of upperworld offenses. The
most obvious element in this explanation is that white-collar
defendants may use the power they frequently enjoy to extract
explicit sentence bargains. Defense counsel for white-collar de-
fendants, and the defendants themselves, are unlikely to accept
the consequences of guilty pleas unless they are convinced that
the disposition will be favorable. By contrast, those conven-
tional underworld offenders, who are more experienced in the
dispositional process and also effectively represented, may be
willing to rely on less explicit, customary understandings. Fur-
thermore, this variation in sentence bargaining practices may
reflect more general differences between upperworld and un-
derworld vocational styles.
Prosecutors pursuing upperworld offenders also have an in-
terest in making their promises of concessions and threats of
coercion explicit. The following excerpts from our interviews
give some idea of the scale of resource investment required in
the proactive prosecution of upperworld crime.
It is damn hard to . . . successfully prosecute these kinds of cases.
They [U.S. Attorneys] shouldn't go in unless they know how to do it
and they frequently don't know how to do it.
It would be nice to investigate let's say public corruption. "Okay, FBI, I
want you to go out and develop snitches in all the HEW places where
they might be taking bribes" ... but God knows how much time (that
would take] and we don't have the resources to do that.
It is difficult-it is a very difficult process of trying to do everything that
should be done and yet still allowing yourself to free up enough re-
sources to do the cases that are more difficult and need to be done but
aren't so obvious. There's always a balancing act that is very difficult.
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This type of investment in proactive prosecution may be suffi-
ciently great that prosecutors are forced to extend themselves
in ways that will increase the assurance of conviction, including
explicit sentence bargaining.
The final factor to be considered parallels the preceding
two and involves the social organization of upperworld crimes.
As we indicated early in our discussion, part of the reason that
upperworld cases are difficult to develop is the absence of a
highly visible victim. Even though upperworld crimes clearly
do have victims, the complexity and diffuseness of the victimi-
zation present some of the same problems for effective prose-
cution that arise in victimless crimes. Without victims to
testify about the criminal events, it usually is necessary to cul-
tivate sources of information and evidence from within the
criminal operation. In conventional victimless crimes, police
can develop such informers at the street level with money,
drugs, and other material bribes or, failing this, through covert,
implicit promises and threats (Skolnick, 1966). In contrast, up-
perworld witnesses and informers must be approached in more
formal and publicly visible ways. Whether the inducement is a
promise or threat, the arrangement is more likely to become
explicit in character.
This explicit use of concessions and coercion in the proac-
tive prosecution of upperworld crime has an important advan-
tage: it is visible for public scrutiny and criticism in a way that
most plea bargaining is not. It thereby forces the question:
how many concessions and how much coercion is appropriate
in the prosecution of upperworld or underworld crime? Such a
question cannot be answered by empirical research.
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